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Abstract:
Purpose:  The most important feature of  modern corporations is the separation of  investors’
ownership  and  managers’  control.  With  the  development  of  modern  corporate  system,
principal-agent problem has been replaced by the agent problem between  large shareholders
and small shareholders gradually. The reform of  rights and interests started from April 30, 2005
is aimed to realize the convergence of  the interests of  shareholders, improve the corporation
management and reduce the controllers’ private benefits. However, with the strengthening of
market  mechanisms large  shareholders  possibly  grab  private  benefits  by  means  of  multiple
controls of  corporation and the secondary market. According to statistics, by the end of  2012,
more than 95% of  the original state-owned listed company completed the reform of  rights and
interests. With the banning of  non-tradable shares has been relieved, China capital market starts
to embrace the new era of  full share circulation, which could further aggravate big shareholders
encroaching upon small ones. Therefore, the purpose of  this paper is to provide an approach to
study the large shareholders behavior after the Non-tradable Share Reform especially from the
view of  Related Party Transactions.
Design/methodology/approach: This paper explores the behavior choice of  large shareholders in the
related party transactions which occur between the large shareholders and listed companies by
using the data of  shares from 2007 to 2010. Based on the classical research paradigm (that is,
LLSV),  this article analysis controlling shareholders’ propping and tunneling behaviors aiming
to make sure their impacts to the medium and small shareholders in theory.
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Findings:  We  get  the  following  findings:  After  our  capital  market  entering  the  era  of  full
circulation, we find that the relationship between the ratio of  controlling shareholders and the
related party transactions present (RPTs) an inverted “U” shape curve, which means that it exits
a typical “Grab-synergy” effect. We should take different measures to the transactions occurred
between the large shareholders and listed companies according to the property nature of  the
large shareholders. State-owned shareholders choose to realize their private benefits by means
of  RPTs,  while  the  non-state-owned  shareholders  conduct  RPTs  with  an  expectation  of
reducing costs.
Practical  implications:  Since  Guo  Shuqing,  the  Chairman  of  China  Securities  Regulatory
Commission, took office, he has taken a lot measures to curb the related party transactions
harshly.  Under  this  circumstance,  it  is  just  the  right  time  to  have  a  research  on  large
shareholders’ behavior. It has important significance both in theory and practice.
Originality/value: Considering the Chinese special national conditions, this paper added lots of
comprehensive facts to study large shareholders’ behavior including the rate of  the share held
by indirect controller, the probability of  thievish behaviors have been discovered, and the strict
punishment regulations. The discussions in this paper help to bring into focus a highly topical
issue within the context of  the large shareholders’ behavior after Non-tradable Shares Reform.
Keywords:  related  party  transactions (RPTs),  separation  factor,  equity  restriction,  non-tradable  shares
reform
1. Introduction
An increasing number of  studies  show that  publicly  listed firms around the world  have a
concentrated ownership structure (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1999; Claessens,
Djankov & Lang, 2000).  Corporate ownership is concentrated in the hands of the controlling
shareholders (Faccio  & Lang,  2002) or  the  large  shareholders.  In  such  a  concentrated
ownership environment, the agency problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) arises from the conflicts
between the controlling and minority shareholders, particularly when the voting rights of the
big shareholders exceed their cash-flow rights (Bozec & Laurin, 2008). Thus, the existence of
investors with high ownership stakes may not lead to firm value maximization. The divergence
between the controlling shareholders’  voting and cash flow rights motivates the controlling
shareholders to expropriate firm resources to pursue their own interest, thereby undermining
the firm performance and minority shareholders’  interests (Claessens et al.,  2000). In this
circumstance,  there  is  likely  to  exist  a  related  party  transaction.  Although  a  number  of
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definitions exist, RPTs are generically regarded as transactions between a company and related
entities  such  as  subsidiaries,  affiliates,  principal  owners,  officers,  and  directors  (D’Souza,
Ramesh  &  Shen 2010).  Academic  literature  has  long  been  interested  in  the  relationship
between firm performance and RPTs (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2002).
With regard to the means used by the large shareholders to expropriate (tunnel) firm resource,
Johnson,  La  Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) claimed that the large shareholders
could  use  self-dealing  transactions  such  as  asset  sales  and  contracts  with  advantageous
transfer prices as a means of tunneling. Besides, Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006) suggested
that certain RPTs such as asset acquisition, asset sales, equity sales, trading relationships and
cash payments are a priori likely to result in expropriation of minority shareholders’ interest.
Jian and Wong (2004) demonstrated that when listed companies have more cash, they will
provide  generous  credits  to  related  parties  (RP).  These  above-mentioned  self-dealing  or
connected party transactions are referred to as RPTs in the field of accounting.
Additionally, the view of potential expropriation, a positive view of RPTs also exists (Jian  &
Wong, 2004; Cheung et al., 2006) which considers them as transactions conducted during the
proper  course  of  business  to  enhance  the  efficiency  of  an  organization  by  minimizing
transaction  cost  through  strong  business  ties.  Listed  companies  can  employ  this  type  of
“strategic” RPTs to achieve performance goals by reducing transaction costs (Khanna & Palepu,
1997).  These  two  opposing  perspectives  make  the  issue  of  whether  RPTs  benefit  firm
performance debatable.
Recently,  some  scholars  also  pay  a  lot  of  attention  to  the  situation  of  China  since  the
Non-tradable  Shares  Reform.  In  April  2005,  the  China  Securities  Regulatory  Commission
(CSRC) promulgated the notice relevant to pilot reform on the segmented shares structure of
listed companies as part of its efforts to promote improved corporate governance and stronger
capital markets. The notice was intended to reduce the disparity in earnings between tradable
and non-tradable shares,  ensuring that  all  of  the shareholders in  a given company had a
common interest. Based on 234 listed companies’ data from 2004 to 2006, Hong (2008) make
an empirical study on impacting factors on ordinary RPTs before and after the reform of share
rights  splitting.  By  using  the  connected  transactions  of  listed  companies  from  2004  to
2008， this paper finds that the largest shareholder will reduce the interest occupy of listed
companies and small and medium share-holders after the reform and the effect of reform is
initially manifested (Liang & Yilong, 2011).
In short,  the existing literature  on large shareholders  behavior selection and RPTs  studies
seldom connected the effect of Non-tradable Shares Reform. The aim of this paper is therefore
to  explore  the  large  shareholders’  behavior  from  the  perspective  of  RTPs  since  the
Non-tradable Shares Reform.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces relative theory and
outlines our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data source and empirical design. Section 4
discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Theory and Research Hypotheses 
For a long time, empirical evidence has shown that widely held firms are not the norm in most
countries. In a ground breaking study, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999)
show  that  in  many  countries  outside  both  the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom,
companies tend to be owned by controlling shareholders who possess a substantial proportion
of voting rights and enjoy almost total control over the firm’s operations. For these companies,
the agency costs do not result from the traditional conflict between outside shareholders and
managers.  Instead,  the costs  are caused by the conflict  between large shareholders,  who
control the firm’s assets, and minority shareholders, who provide financing but run the risk of
expropriation (Grossman & Hart, 1988).
In  markets  with  disperse  ownership  structure,  the  conflicts  of  interest  between  disperse
investors and executives are the principal conflicts. Because the costs to monitor executives
directly  are  extremely  high  for  disperse  shareholders,  they  either  align  the  interests  of
executives  with  them through  incentive  contracts  or  choose  “voting  by  foot”  through  the
market for corporate control. In contrast, the costs to monitor board for large shareholders are
low thus they have enough incentives to monitor board directly and alleviate the opportunism
problem thereby. So the presence of a controlling shareholder would be beneficial to disperse
minority shareholders in the respect of monitoring executives. Minority shareholders played as
free riders may entrust large shareholders to monitor executives for them. However, there is
no free lunch. Large shareholders’ self-interest and opportunism would lead to rent-seeking.
They would expropriate disperse investors by their controlling and informational advantages.
The stronger for the big shareholders control the firm, the more possibility there exists RPTs.
After our capital market entering the era of full circulation, the relationship between the ratio
of the controlling shareholder and the related party transaction presents an inverted “U” shape
curve,  which means  that  it  exits  a  typical  “Grab-synergy”  effect  (Maury &  Pajuste,  2005;
Zengquan, Zheng & Zhiwei, 2004). When the share ratio of big shareholder is low, he chooses
to grab the private controlling benefit to realize his controlling interest. On the contrary, as the
increase  of  share  ratio,  big  shareholders  tend  to  supervise  the  managers  to  achieve  the
sharing controlling benefit.
Based on the Human nature theory, the influence of related party transaction is neutral. To
study  clearly,  we  assume that  RPTs  occurred  between  the  big  shareholder  and  the  listed
companies are harmful to the interest of our small investors. According to the last empirical
test  outcome,  we  can  accept  or  overthrow  the  assumption  at  last.  This  paper  therefore
establishes the following hypotheses:
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H1: When the share ratio of large shareholder is low (say less than 30%), the occurrence
probability of RPTs increased with the increase of his share ratio; while the share ratio of big
shareholder is high (say more than 30%), the probability of RPTs decreased.
When there are multiple large shareholders, competition forced the large shareholders to make
a commitment to minority shareholders to maximize the firm’s profit, which is an effective way
of inhibiting RPTs. The deeper equity restriction is, the better the firm’s performance is (Maury
& Pajuste, 2005). The second hypothesis is as follow:
H2: The deeper the extent of equity restriction existed among the shareholders, the less of the
RPTs exist.
Considering  the  special  social  background  of  the  state-owned  listed  companies,  the  ever
“capital constraint” degenerates into “blood transfusion” behavior engaged in RPTs with the
listed companies. Therefore, we have come to the third hypothesis:
H3:  Compared  with  non-state-owned  enterprises,  the  largest  shareholder  of  state-owned
enterprises tends to choose RPTs to realize its private controlling benefits.
Experience  has  shown  that  the  better  external  market  environment,  the  more  fierce
competition  and regulations  can largely  restrict  big shareholders’  private  interest  grabbing
behaviors (Cheung et al., 2006). Consequently, we propose the following hypothesis:
H4:  The  better  the external  market  environment  can reduce  large shareholders’  grabbing
benefit more effective.
According to H3, if state-owned shareholders is more inclined to grab the private benefits by
means of RPTs compared with non-state shareholder,  the improvement of external market
environment have a stronger restriction to state-owned shareholders’ grabbing behavior. On
the basis of assumption 4, we put forward a sub-hypothesis:
H4a: Compared with non-state shareholder, the improvement of external market environment
has a stronger restriction to state-owned shareholders’ grabbing behavior
As we discussed in the introduction, two conflicting views are considered when examining
RPTs. Some consider RPTs as value creating transactions and a tool of reducing the relative
costs, while others consider them a means of expropriating firm’s resources. How about the
different property nature of the big shareholders? Theoretically, the state-owned shareholders
owing to its special background have a motivation to associate with RTPs. Accordingly; we get
the following two hypotheses:
H5:  State-owned shareholders  who  associated  with  RTPs  with  listed  company  is  likely  to
expropriate,  while  non-state-owned  shareholders  engaged  in  RPTs  probably  for  reducing
transaction costs.
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3. Data Source and Empirical Design
3.1. Data and Sample
Our study was  limited to  the post  Non-tradable  Shares  Reform era.  According to  existing
literature, we believe the year 2006 as the first year of Non-tradable Shares Reform era is
reasonable. We collected all data from the CSMAR database. The primary sample consists of A-
shares data of the Chinese stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2006 and
2010. Then we excluded share of the financial industry, cross-listed stocks and "ST" stocks. For
big shareholders’ behavior of "ST" is different from that of the normal listed companies. Finally,
we  get  the  sample  comprised  242  Chinese  listed  companies.  In  addition,  the  ownership
structure data, industry and provincial data are from the Genius database, statistical database
of regional GDP data from a  research (Gang, Xiaolu &  Henpeng, 2011)  of China Economic
Information Network, the market environment.
3.2. Variables and Empirical Models
Dependent Variables
RPT is a neutral market behavior. As long as the prices of RPTs are fair and information is
disclosed timely, RPTs are legal and accepted. However, the fact of Chinese listed companies is
that large shareholders transfer firm’s assets in the name of RPTs. Based on the study of Feng,
Jiangnag and  Minghai (2004),  here  RPTs  mainly  focus  on  the  buying  and  selling  assets
between large shareholders and listed companies.
Independent Variables
Independent Variables are divided into three categories that is ownership structure, director
characteristics and market environment.
Control variables
Control  variables include assets  scale  (LnAsset),  asset-liability  ratio  (Debt),  the four  audit
committee (Audit) and year variable (year). 
Specific definitions were in Table 1.
To test the “inverted U-shaped” relationship between controlling shareholders and RPTs from
the full sample observation, we used the following model (1)：
2
0 1 1 2 1 3 2~10 4 5 6
2
7 8 9 10 11
0
Separation
i i
i
RPT Top Top Top NS Control
Law LnAsset Debt Audit Year
α α α α α α α
α α α α α ε+
=
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + +∑ (1)
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Category
Kind of
Variables
Name of Variables Code Definition and Description
Dependent 
Variables
Related Party 
Transactions
RPTs
Selling of RP/ operating income+sourcing of 
RP/operating cost
Firm performance Tobin’Q
The sum of market value of equity and the 
book value of debt divided by the book value 
of the total assets.
Ownership 
Structure
Independent 
Variables
Ratio of the largest 
shareholder
Top1 The largest shareholder’ shares/ total shares
Separation factor Separation
Based on Claessens et al. (2000) study, 
Separation = cash-flow rights/ voting rights
Equity restriction Top2-10
Sum of the second to the tenth 
shareholders’ shareholding ratio
Large state-owned 
shareholder 
NS
Dummy variable, the controlling 
shareholders are government agencies, 
state-owned firms or schools, NS=1, 
otherwise, the NS = 0
Board 
Characteristics
Board scale Board Number of board members
Ratio of directors 
appointed by controlling 
shareholders
Control
Directors appointed by large 
shareholders/total directors
Market 
Environment
Environment of Law Law Legalization index
Firm Level
Control 
Variables
Asset scale LnAsset Logarithm of total assets
Asset-liability ratio Debt Total debt/total assets.
The four audit 
committee
Audit
Dummy variable if the firm is one of the 
biggest four and it committee, the 
Audit = 1, otherwise, the Audit = 0
Year Year
Dummy variable, set to 1 if data of the 
sample is the year 2007, 0 Otherwise, and 
so on.
Table 1. Variables Defined and Descriptive Statistics
Equation (2) is used to verify Hypothesis H4a
0 1 1 2 2~10 3 4 5 6
2
7 8 9 10
0
Separation
i i
i
RPT Top Top Control NS NS Law
LnAsset Debt Audit Year
α α α α α α α
α α α α ε+
=
= + + + + + + ×
+ + + + +∑ (2)
In order to analyze the true intention of the large shareholders’ RPTs with the listed companies
form the respective of property rights and firm performance, we have established the following
model:
2
0 1 2 1 3 4
0
Separation i i
i
TobinQ RPT Top Yearα α α α α ε+
=
= + + + + +∑
-980-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.778
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
From the above table 2, ownership structure is quite concentrated with the average proportion
32.94%. Separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights is 0.80 on average. Besides,
77% controlling shareholders are state-owned. As for board scale, a typical  Chinese listed
company has more than nine people and 27.9% of directors among them are appointed by the
controlling shareholder on average. In addition, 36.2 % are independent, which slightly meet
the China Securities Regulatory Commission requirement. Only about 5% of listed companies
to accept the big four audit committee services. 
Variables Min. Max. Mean St. Dev.
RPT 6.22 28.72 19.6529 2.11332
TOP1 0.00 0．84 0.3294 0.16763
TOP2-10 0.0096 0.5204 0.140488 0.104874
SEPERATION .08 1.00 0.8039 0.25046
NS 0 1 0.77 0.420
BOARD 5 17 9.52 1.930
CONTROL 0.000 0.750 0.279 0.166
INDEP 0.1250 0.5714 0.3620 0.0515
LAW 2.11 16.61 6.8578 3.2187
LNASSENT 19.2362 25.8100 22.0363 1.0318
DEBT 0.0108 .8857 0.5234 0.1658
AUDIT 0 1 0.05 0.213
Notes: This table reports  summary statistics,  period between 2006 and 2010, 242 firm-year  observations,  obtained from CSMAR
database. See, the Appendix for definitions of variables.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
4. Empirical Findings
In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, we adopt Pearson method to test the correlation
coefficient between the independent variables. The correlation analysis results were shown in
table 3.
TOP1 TOP2-10 SEPR. NS CONTROL LLAW NASSENT DEBT AUDIT
RPT 189 (***) -.041 007 .131 (***) 131 (***) -.031 .502 (***) .171 (***) .109 (***)
TOP1 1 -.389 (***) .104 (***) .206 (***) .248 (***) -.103 (***) .262 (***) -.029 .049
TOP2-10 1 -.078 (**) -.221 (***) -.135 (***) -.081 (**) -.042 -.136 (***) .160 (***)
SEPE. 1 .477 (***) .034 -.029 .125 (***) .010 .025
NS  1 .112 (***) -.185 (***) .123 (***) .148 (***) .052
CONTROL   1 .065 (**) .228 (***) .052 .056
LAW    1 -.034 -.057 .076 (**)
LNASSENT     1 .307 (***) .257 (***)
DEBT      1 -.018
AUDIT       1
Note: ***, **, indicate significance at the level of 1% and 5% respectively.
Table 3. Variables Pearson Analysis
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From table 3, share ratio of the largest shareholder, ratio of directors appointed by controlling
shareholders,  state-owned  shareholder,  asset  scale,  and  asset-liability  ratio  is  positively
associated with the possibility of the RPTs. This means that the higher the relatively indicator,
the more possibility engaged with RPTs undertaken by Chinese listed companies. In addition,
there is a negative relationship between equity restrictions, environment of law is negatively
associated with the RPTs. Although the improvement of law environment and structure balance
has an effect on restricting the RPTs, the outcome is limited. 
Regression Analysis
Code
Model (1) Model (2)
(i) Subsample 1
(<30%)
(ii) Subsample 2
(≥30%)
(iii) Sample
(iv) Subsample
(<30%)
(v) Subsample
(≥30%)
(vi)
Sample
C
-1.666 2.029 -1.560 -1.281 1.596 -1.688
.564 .230 .283 .652 .339 .237
TOP1
1.796 -.747 1.346 1.816 -.702 1.316
.048** .132 .065 .048 .363 .074
Top12
-.624  -.582
.094  .552
TOP2-10
1.221 -.289 .754 1.162 -.189 .758
.188 .238 .239 .212 .826 .237
SEPE.
-.739 -3.060 -.767 -.702 -3.103 -.785
.086 .000*** .034 .100 .000 .029
NS
.787 .302 .564 .620 .544 .679
.001 .024 .001 .055 .065 .001
CONTROL
-.635 .803 .093 -.578 .794 .083
.281 .071 .797 .322 .075 .817
LAW
.025 -.043 -.014   
.394 .095 .082   
LAW*NS
.018 -.026 -.014
.605 .343 .524
LNASSENT
.959 .949 .968 .949 .952 .970
.000*** .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
DEBT
.154 .253 .152 .159 .266 .148
.787 .609 .685 .781 .591 .694
AUDIT
-.661 -.103 -.231 -.650 -.140 -.231
.227 .348 .416 .235 .665 .417
YEAR controlled Controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Adj.R2 .227 .401 .311 .205 .398 .311
F Value 10.595 29.854 34.435 10.545 29.586 34.425
Note: Data in the first line are coefficient; Data in the second line are P value. ***, **, indicate significance at the level of 1% and 5%
respectively. Subsample 1 (＜30%) means the proportion of the largest shareholder is less than 30%, similarly, subsample 2 (≥30%) is
more than 30%.
Table 4. Regression Result of Model (1), (2)
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According to result  (i),  coefficient of  Top1 is positively significant at the level of  5%. This
means  when  the  share  proportion  of  the  largest  shareholder  is  less  than  30%,  RPTs
undertaken between controlling shareholder and listed companies increased as the increase of
the share ratio of big shareholders. On the contrary, when that is over30%, RPTs lessened
seeing result (ii). Checking the whole sample (iii), the coefficient of Top12 is -0.624. Just as we
expected, the relationship between the ratio of the control shareholder and RPTs presents an
inverted “U” shape curve. In another word, there indeed exit a typical “Grab-synergy” effect.
Consequently, H1 are supported. Analyses similarly, we find both H3 and H4 are supported
according to table 4.
Property Rights and Large Shareholders Behavior Selection
RTPs should not be any that a bad thing. It is neutral by nature. After the Non-tradable Shares
Reform, whether different property rights of controlling shareholders associated with RPTs will
lead to  different  effect  on the firm performance? Next we will  discuss  the answer  to  this
question.
State-owned shares Non-State-owned shares
Variables Coefficient P Value Coefficient P Value
C 3.626 .000 .456 .601
RPT -.098 .000 .096 .021
TOP1 2.087 .000 .815 .259
SEPR. -.026 .915 .157 .648
YEAR Controlled controlled controlled controlled
Adj.R2 .218 .191
F Value 35.504 9.640
Table 5. Regression Result of Model (3)
When the ultimate controlling shareholders are state-owned, there is a negative relationship
between RPTs and the performance of listed companies, significant at the 1% level. However,
when  Non-state-owned,  that  is  a  significant  positive  relationship.  Separation  factor  is  not
significantly  associated  with  the  firm  performance  both  in  two  subsamples.  A  plausible
explanation for this is that entering the era of full share circulation, either state-owned or Non-
state-owned, the separation of voting rights from cash-flow rights has improved a lot.
5. Conclusion
Based  on  the  RPTs  data  between  2007  and  2010,  we  analyze  the  large  shareholder’s
expropriating behavior. The following conclusions were drawn.
First of all, when the share proportion of the largest shareholder is low (say less than 30%),
RPTs  undertaken  between  controlling  shareholder  and  listed  companies  increased  as  the
increase  of  the  share  ratio  of  big  shareholders.  Firms  are  exposed  to  an  entrenchment
problem, which is a situation where the dominant shareholders have the power to use the firm
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in the pursuit of their own interests rather than the interests of all shareholders. While big
shareholder tends to supervise the managers to achieve the sharing controlling benefit when
that ratio is big enough. 
Secondly, compared to non-state-owned shareholders, state-owned shareholders are more apt
to  achieve their  private  benefits  by  means  of  RPTs.  This  is  an institutional  background of
lessening state-owned shares holding. Sound external market environments especially the law
environment  help  to  curb  the  controlling  shareholder’s  grab  behavior.  Therefore,  the
improvement of law environment is more helpful to restrict state-owned shareholders’ RPTs
compared with that of non -state-owned shareholders. 
Thirdly, larger companies are more inclined to associate with RPTs with listed firms. The bigger
the separation between voting and cash-flow rights, the smaller the controlling shareholders’
expropriation  cost.  For  this  reason,  the  independent  director  system is  introduced  to  our
capital market. However, its effect is too far from our expectation.
Finally,  empirical  studies have found that different property nature have different reaction.
Because  state-owned  companies  have  more  social  burden,  they  will  expropriate  minority
shareholders’ interests through RPTs. The state-own companies associated with RPTs mostly
want to pursue their private interests. In contrast, non -state owned businesses are engaged
in RPTs expecting to save transaction cost.
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